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The Supreme Court of Canada’s standard of review jurisprudence has been marked
by the ascendancy of reasonableness as the presumptive standard of review of
decisions involving an administrative tribunal’s interpretation and application of its
home statute. To the extent that this approach would lead to the reasonableness
review of administrative decision-makers’ interpretation of the scope and meaning
of provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that implement the
basic human rights conferred in international conventions to which Canada is a
party, it must be changed. Interpretations of the scope of the Refugee Convention
and Convention Against Torture raise questions of law of central importance to the
legal system and outside the relative expertise of decision-makers under the Act.
Such questions warrant uniform and consistent answers that can ultimately only be
provided by national courts. Moreover, given the serious impact of refugee protection
decisions on the claimants’ life, liberty and security of the person, tolerating divergent
interpretations of basic human rights through reasonableness review is arbitrary and
contrary to the rule of law. Accordingly, the potential for inconsistent interpretations
must be resolved decisively through correctness review.
La jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada en matière de contrôle judiciaire a
été marquée par la prédominance du caractère raisonnable comme norme présumée
quand il s’agit de statuer sur des décisions concernant l’interprétation et l’application
par un tribunal administratif de sa propre loi. Dans la mesure où cette approche
conduirait à l’examen du caractère raisonnable de l’interprétation par les décideurs
administratifs de la portée et du sens des dispositions de la Loi sur l’immigration et la
protection des réfugiés qui mettent en œuvre les droits fondamentaux de la personne
conférés par les conventions internationales auxquelles le Canada est partie, elle
doit être modiﬁée. L’interprétation de la portée de la Convention relative au statut
des réfugiés et de la Convention contre la torture soulève des questions de droit
d’une importance capitale pour le système juridique et ne relève pas de l’expertise
relative des décideurs administratifs en vertu de la Loi. De telles questions justiﬁent
des réponses uniformes et cohérentes qui ne peuvent en ﬁn de compte être fournies
que par des juridictions nationales. De plus, étant donné les graves répercussions
des décisions en matière d’asile sur la vie, la liberté et la sécurité des demandeurs
d’asile, il est arbitraire et contraire à la primauté du droit de tolérer des interprétations
divergentes des droits fondamentaux de la personne au moyen d’un contrôle du
caractère raisonnable. Par conséquent, la possibilité d’interprétations incohérentes
doit être résolue de façon décisive au moyen d’un examen de l’exactitude.
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Introduction
Beginning in 2010 with the Balanced Refugee Reform Act1 and
culminating with the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act2 in
2012, Parliament engaged in a signi¿cant reform of Canada’s immigration
and refugee protection regime, which is the focus of this special issue.3
These legislative efforts were only the opening act in an ensuing legal
drama in which refugee claimants and their advocates challenged the
constitutionality of many of the new enactments before the courts.4
Far from the litigation spotlight, refugee protection decision-makers,
including members of the Immigration and Refugee Board’s (IRB)
Refugee Protection Division (RPD) and Refugee Appeal Division (RAD),
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) of¿cers at Immigration, Refugees
and Citizenship Canada and delegates of the Minister of Public Safety and
1.
An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Federal Courts Act, SC
2010, c 8 [Balanced Refugee Reform Act].
2.
An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act,
the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, SC
2012, c 17 [Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act].
3.
Amendments to Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]
relating to refugee protection included changes to the quali¿cations and manner of appointment for ¿rst
instance refugee protection decision-makers in the Immigration and Refugee Board’s (IRB) Refugee
Protection Division (RPD), the creation of a Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to hear appeals from
RPD decisions, the tightening of timelines to accelerate the refugee protection process and the creation
of new categories of refugee claimants (claimants from designated countries of origin deemed to be
“safe” and “designated foreign nationals”) that were subjected to refugee protection determination
processes procedurally and substantially less favourable than those afforded to refugee claimants who
did not fall within these categories: see, generally, Emily Bates, Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman,
“Troubling Signs: Mapping Access to Justice in Canada as Refugee System Reform” (2015–16) 47
Ottawa L Rev 1 for a full description of reforms to Canada’s Refugee Status Determination system.
4.
See, e.g., YZ v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892. The Federal Court decided
that the provision denying an appeal before the RAD to protection claimants from designated countries
of origin violated s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, Appendix II, No 44 [Charter].
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Emergency Preparedness took up the task of interpreting and applying
the new provisions of their home statute, the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act.

Around the time of these reforms, Canadian courts,
including the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal, which
are responsible for reviewing the decisions of federal administrative
decision-makers under the IRPA and other federal statutes, were still
coming to grips with an important shift in the evolution of Canada’s
approach to the judicial review of administrative action. In its 2008
decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,5 the Supreme Court of
Canada had revisited the standard of review framework, under which
reviewing courts seek to resolve the tension between their twin
obligations: to uphold the rule of law by enforcing the legal limits
of administrative decision-makers’ statutory powers and to respect
legislative supremacy by not interfering unduly “with the discharge
of administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated to
administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures.”6 The most
signi¿cant change arising from Dunsmuir was the emergence of
reasonableness as the default standard of review, including for
questions of statutory interpretation:
…[U]nless the situation is exceptional…the interpretation by the
tribunal of “its own statute or statutes closely connected to its function,
with which it will have particular familiarity” should be presumed to
be a question of statutory interpretation subject to deference on judicial
review.7

Whereas the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal once regularly
reviewed decisions under the IRPA involving questions of statutory
interpretation on the intrusive correctness standard, the “triumph of
deference” heralded by Dunsmuir promised to place ¿rmly in the hands
of administrative decision-makers, including IRB members and PRRA
of¿cers, primary authority to decide the meaning and scope of the IRPA’s
provisions.8 As important as the legislative reforms themselves, these
5.
2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].
6.
Ibid at para 27.
7.
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61
at para 34 [Alberta Teachers’ Association].
8.
The Federal Court of Appeal noted the shift from correctness to reasonableness review of
interpretations of the IRPA in JP v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 FCA
262 at para 74 (CA).
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judicial reforms to the legal framework governing who gets to decide what
the IRPA means are the focus of our contribution.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the current
framework for determining the standard of review and demonstrates how
the Supreme Court has severely constricted the application of correctness
review by narrowly de¿ning as exceptional those categories of questions
that demand correctness review and by limiting resort to the analysis of
contextual factors that could indicate that Parliament or the legislature
intended correctness rather than reasonableness review. It brieÀy
reviews recent jurisprudence on the standard applicable to the review
of administrative decision-makers’ interpretations of the provisions of
the IRPA. While the Supreme Court has not yet expressly applied the
correctness standard, it has on occasion engaged in an intrusive review of
some interpretations of the IRPA that resembles correctness review. Part
II discusses why, despite the ascendancy of reasonableness review in the
Supreme Court’s standard of review jurisprudence, correctness review still
matters and remains appropriate in certain circumstances. In particular, it
argues that correctness should be recognized as the applicable standard
of review for decisions relating to the interpretation of those provisions
of the IRPA that serve to implement basic human rights conferred in
international conventions binding on Canada, including the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees9 and the Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.10 Though
the article focuses on statutory interpretation in the refugee protection
context, the arguments for correctness review apply with equal force to the
interpretation of provisions in other statutes that de¿ne the scope of basic
human rights, including the federal and provincial human rights codes.
Part III explores the perils of applying a reasonableness standard to such
questions, including the risk of divergent administrative interpretations
of the scope of provisions of the IRPA that confer to refugee claimants
basic human rights protection. Part IV explores statutory alternatives to
the common-law approach to deciding the intensity with which courts
review administrative decision-makers’ interpretations of the IRPA. It asks
whether Parliament should set down statutory standards of review for
decisions under the IRPA and what such a scheme might look like.

9.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, Can TS 1969 No 6
(entered into force 22 April 1954) [Refugee Convention].
10. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Can TS 1987 No 36 (entered into force 26 June 1987) [Convention
Against Torture].
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We conclude that, to the extent that the Supreme Court’s current
approach to determining the standard of review would lead to the
reasonableness review of the scope and meaning of provisions of the IRPA
that serve to implement the basic human rights conferred in international
conventions to which Canada is a party, this approach must be changed.
The prospect of further reforms to the standard of review framework is far
from hypothetical. In May 2018, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal
in three matters—two involving appeals from an order of the Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission11 and a third
involving judicial review of a decision of the Registrar of citizenship.12 In
doing so, it noted that the cases provided “an opportunity to consider the
nature and scope of judicial review of administrative action, as addressed
in Dunsmuir (…) and subsequent cases” and invited the parties to address
the question of standard of review in their submissions.13 After hearing oral
submissions in December 2018 and receiving briefs from 27 interveners,
amici curiae and the parties, the Court reserved judgment. We offer our
views in this article in the hope that they may contribute to the Court’s reexamination of the standard of review framework.
I.

The standard of review analysis and judicial review of administrative
interpretations of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
Canada’s framework for judicial review seeks to reconcile the role
of courts in upholding the rule of law by ensuring that administrative
decision-makers do not overstep the jurisdictional bounds of their statutory
authority with legislatures’ intent to confer on these decision-makers the
primary, if not exclusive, authority to decide certain questions. Before
the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Canadian Union of Public
Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp,14 reviewing courts
subjected “questions that fall within a decision-maker’s jurisdiction” to
deferential review and “questions that affect its jurisdiction” to intrusive
review. Unfortunately, these formalistic but highly manipulable categories
did little to constrain creative advocates and judges who might be eager

11. Bell Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 249, leave to appeal to SCC granted,
[2018] SCCA No 9.
12. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2017 FCA 132, leave to appeal to SCC granted,
[2017] SCCA No 352.
13. Ibid.
14. [1979] 2 SCR 227, 97 DLR (3d) 417 [CUPE].
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to overturn administrative decisions.15 For that reason, beginning in the
1980s, Canadian courts opted for a “pragmatic and functional” approach16
by which they selected one of three “standards of review” that governed
the intensity with which they reviewed an administrative decision.17
“Correctness” review assumes a single right answer to the question
under review. The reviewing court must undertake its own analysis of the
question and, if it does not agree with the administrative decision-maker’s
determination, substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.18
“Reasonableness simpliciter” required the court to assess whether the
decision-maker’s reasons for a decision adequately supported the decision.
“Patent unreasonableness” required the court to evaluate whether these
reasons were marked by an obvious defect making the decision so clearly
irrational that no amount of curial deference could justify letting it stand.19
In choosing the appropriate standard, reviewing courts sought to discern
legislative intent keeping in mind their role in maintaining the rule of
law and in a manner that paid more attention “to statutory purposes and
structures and the sense they conveyed of the relevant tribunals’ expected
areas of competence or expertise.”20 As the Supreme Court stated in CUPE
v. Ontario (Ministry of Labour):
This “pragmatic and functional” approach to ascertain the legislative
intent requires an assessment and balancing of relevant factors,
including (1) whether the legislation that confers the power contains a
privative cause; (2) the relative expertise as between the court and the
statutory decision maker; (3) the purpose of the particular provision
and the legislation as a whole; and (4) the nature of the question before
the decision maker.…The examination of these four factors, and the
“weighing up” of contextual elements to identify the appropriate
standard of review, is not a mechanical exercise. Given the immense
range of discretionary decision makers and administrative bodies, the
test is necessarily Àexible, and proceeds by principled analysis rather
than categories, seeking the polar star of legislative intent.21
15. This classi¿cation approach was rejected by the Supreme Court as unhelpful, with Justice
Dickson warning courts against branding as “jurisdictional, and therefore subject to broader curial
review that which may be doubtfully so”: CUPE, ibid, at 233. For a history of the development by
Canadian courts of a deferential approach to the judicial review of administrative decisions, see Paul
Daly, “The Struggle for Deference in Canada” in Hanna Wiberg & Mark Elliott, The Scope and
Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) 297.
16. This term was ¿rst coined by Justice Beetz in Union des Employés de Service v Bibeault, [1988]
2 SCR 1048 at 1088, 95 NR 161.
17. Law Society of New Brunswick v Ryan, 2003 SCC 20 at para 24 [Ryan].
18. Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 50.
19. See generally Dr Q v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19 at
para 20 [Dr. Q].
20. David J Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 63.
21. CUPE v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 at para 149.
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The pragmatic and functional approach was not without its problems.
It provided “great Àexibility but little real on-the-ground guidance”
and offered “too many standards of review.”22 In Dunsmuir, the Court
undertook to develop a “simpler test” that “offers guidance, is not
formalistic or arti¿cial, and permits review where justice requires it, but
not otherwise.”23 Under its new approach, the Court collapsed the two
deferential standards into a single reasonableness standard that recognized
that some questions considered by administrative decision-makers may
give rise to a number of acceptable and rational solutions. “Concerned
mostly with the existence of justi¿cation, transparency and intelligibility
within the decision-making process” but also “with whether the decision
falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible
in respect of the facts and the law,”24 reasonableness was de¿ned as a
single standard that took “its colour from the context.”25 In practice, this
has meant that requirements of process and the range of acceptable and
rational solutions have varied with the circumstances, including the nature
of the issue.26 For example, under reasonableness review, the Supreme
Court has more intensely scrutinized tribunals’ interpretation of their
enabling statute, assessing whether suf¿cient attention is paid to the text,
context and purpose of legislative provisions27 as required by the modern
approach to statutory interpretation.28 By contrast, its reasonableness
review of decision-makers’ exercise of broad discretionary powers with
few legislative constraints29 or involving matters of general policy and the
weighing of facts30 has been far less aggressive.
The framework for determining the applicable standard of review
established in Dunsmuir and developed in subsequent decisions comprises
several steps. First, the reviewing court surveys the jurisprudence
to ascertain whether the standard has already been determined in a

22. Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 43.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid at para 47.
25. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 59 [Khosa].
26. Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan, 2012 SCC 2 at paras 18 and 29 [Catalyst]; Alberta
Teachers’ Association, supra note 7 at para 85, Binnie J.
27. Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 53 at paras 32-33 [Mowat].
28. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21, 154 DLR (4th) 193.
29. See Catalyst, supra note 26 at para 18, which involved a municipality enacting a taxation by-law.
30. See Khosa, supra note 25 at para 60-67, which involved the decision of the Immigration Appeal
Board that an individual had not shown “suf¿cient humanitarian and compassionate considerations”
to warrant discretionary relief from a valid removal order.
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satisfactory manner.31 If it has, the court applies that standard in reviewing
the merits of the impugned decision. If not, Dunsmuir prescribed that, to
identify the standard of review that appropriately balanced the rule of law
and legislative supremacy, the court proceed to an analysis of contextual
factors including the presence or absence of a privative clause, the purpose
of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of its enabling legislation,
the nature of the question at issue and the relative expertise of the tribunal.32
To simplify this analysis, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the
nature of the question. Signi¿cantly, it af¿rmed reasonableness as the
presumptive standard for the review of questions involving the tribunal’s
interpretation and application of its home statute or of a statute closely
related to its function33 but held that this presumption may be rebutted
in two circumstances. First, a correctness standard applies where the
nature of the question falls within one of four “correctness categories”:
(1) questions relating to the constitutional division of powers and other
constitutional questions; (2) true questions of jurisdiction or vires; (3)
questions regarding the jurisdictional lines between competing specialized
tribunals; and (4) questions of law that are both of central importance to
the legal system as a whole and outside the decision-maker’s specialized
area of expertise [“questions of law of central importance”].34 Second, the
presumption of reasonableness review is rebutted if the context indicates
that the legislature intended correctness review35 by, for example, including
in the enabling statute an unusually-worded statutory appeal clause36
or giving the administrative decision-maker and the courts concurrent
jurisdiction in interpreting its enabling statute at ¿rst instance.37
A clear trend in the Supreme Court’s standard of review jurisprudence
since Dunsmuir has been the ascendancy of reasonableness as the
31. Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 62; Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping
Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47 at para 20 [Capilano]; Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Canada
(AG), 2018 SCC 31 at para 71, Rowe & Côté JJ [CHRC].
32. Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at paras 62, 64 and 68.
33. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 7 at para 30; CHRC, supra note 31 at para 27; CHRC,
supra note 31 at para 73, Rowe & Côté JJ; Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 54, Capilano, supra note 31
at para 22. Questions of fact, discretion or policy or of intertwined legal and factual issues that cannot
be easily separated also attract reasonableness review: Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 53. Where a
tribunal has developed expertise in the application of a general common law or civil law rule in a
speci¿c statutory context, deferential review may also be warranted: Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para
54.
34. Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at paras 58-61; Capilano, supra note 31 at para 24; CHRC, supra note
31 at para 28.
35. Capilano, supra note 31 at para 32.
36. Tervita Corp v Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2015 SCC 3 at para 39 [Tervita].
37. Rogers Communications Inc v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada,
2012 SCC 35 at para 15 [Rogers Communications].
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default or presumptive standard of review of administrative action
and the concomitant contraction of the scope for correctness review.
The presumption of reasonableness review of decisions taken under a
decision-maker’s home statute has gained such predominance within
the categorical approach that it has been called a “black hole” whose
“gravitational pull is so powerful that it threatens to swallow whole” the
categories of correctness review.38 Constitutional questions and questions
regarding the jurisdictional lines between competing specialized tribunals
are narrow categories by their very nature.39 Describing true questions of
jurisdiction or vires as “a narrow and exceptional category of correctness
review,”40 the Court has come to question their very existence.41 It has also
“repeatedly rejected a liberal application”42 of the category of questions of
law of central importance.43 Such questions are reviewed for correctness
because they require uniform and consistent answers44 and because this
safeguards a basic consistency in Canada’s fundamental legal order.45 To
date, the category has only been successfully invoked on three occasions
before the Supreme Court to justify correctness review of, respectively,
the Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner’s decision on whether
the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act46 authorized
the infringement of solicitor-client privilege,47 the Québec Human Rights

38. Paul Daly, “Unreasonable Interpretations of Law” (2014), 66 SCLR (2d) 233 at 235-236.
39. The category of constitutional questions extends to decisions involving the interpretation of
the constitutional division of powers or challenges to the validity of statutory provisions under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Such pure questions of constitutional interpretation are
reviewed on a correctness standard. In contrast, decisions that involve the exercise by administrative
decision-makers of discretionary powers that engage Charter protections are reviewed for
reasonableness and upheld if they proportionately balance limitations on Charter protections with the
statutory objectives pursued by the decision-maker: Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12; Loyola
High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12; Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity
Western University, 2018 SCC 32.
40. CHRC, supra note 31 at para 31.
41. Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 7 at para 34; CHRC, supra note 31 at para 37.
42. CHRC, supra note 31 para 42.
43. Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 60.
44. Ibid at para 60.
45. Ibid at para 60; Mowat, supra note 27 at para 22; McLean v British Columbia (Securities
Commission), 2013 SCC 67 at para 27 [McLean].
46. RSA 2000, c F-25.
47. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v University of Calgary, 2016 SCC 53
[University of Calgary]. Because solicitor-client privilege was a legal privilege concerned with the
protection of a relationship of central importance to the legal system as a whole that had acquired
constitutional dimensions as a principle of fundamental justice and a part of a client’s fundamental
right to privacy, this question had potentially wide implications on other statutes. Moreover, there
was nothing to suggest that the Commissioner had particular expertise with respect to solicitor-client
privilege, an issue traditionally adjudicated by courts.
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Tribunal’s views on the scope of the state’s duty of neutrality48 Àowing
from the guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion in s. 3 of the
Québec Charter of human rights and freedoms49 and a labour arbitrator’s
conclusions on the existence and scope of parliamentary privilege in a
labour dispute involving Québec’s National Assembly.50 As well as
narrowly construing the correctness categories, a majority of the Court has
con¿ned the contextual analysis, once at the core of its standard of review
framework, to a “subordinate role”. To avoid uncertainty in identifying
the applicable standard, it has applied it “sparingly” and in a summary
fashion “in the exceptional cases” where it may be justi¿ed to rebut the
presumption of reasonableness.51 Justice Abella has even mused about the
elimination of correctness as a standard of review, opining that questions
that once invited correctness review based on rule of law principles would
on reasonableness review yield only one reasonable outcome.52
What impact have these developments had on the standard of review
applied to questions of law that arise in decision-making under the IRPA?
In the decade following Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court decided six appeals
that squarely raised this question. Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration)53 and Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)54
concerned the interpretation by the RPD of Articles 1F(a) and 1F(b) of
the Refugee Convention, incorporated through s. 98 of the IRPA. B010 v.
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)55 and Tran v. Canada (Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness)56 involved, respectively, the interpretation
by the IRB’s Immigration Division (ID) and by a delegate of the Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of provisions of the IRPA
that de¿ne the grounds on which permanent residents or foreign nationals
may be found inadmissible to Canada. Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness)57 concerned the decision of the Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to refuse to exempt a non48. Mouvement Laïque Québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16. The Court held, at para 51,
that “the importance of this question to the legal system, its broad and general scope and the need to
decide it in a uniform and consistent manner were undeniable.” While agreeing that the question was
important, Justice Abella held at para 168 that, far from being “outside the adjudicator’s specialized
area of expertise”, it was the Tribunal’s “daily fare.”
49. CQLR c C-12.
50. Chagnon v Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, 2018 SCC 39 at para 17.
51. CHRC, supra note 31 at para 46. See also Capilano, supra note 31 at para 35.
52. Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2016 SCC 29 at para 36 [Wilson].
53. 2013 SCC 40 [Ezokola].
54. 2014 SCC 68 [Febles].
55. 2015 SCC 58 [B010].
56. 2017 SCC 50 [Tran].
57. 2013 SCC 36 [Agraira].
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citizen from a ¿nding of inadmissibility on security grounds. Kanthasamy
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)58 dealt with the decision of
an immigration of¿cer refusing to grant a non-citizen a humanitarian
and compassionate exemption from the statutory requirement to seek
a visa from outside Canada. In Ezokola and Febles, the Court did not
expressly mention the appropriate standard of review. In B010 and Tran,
the Court declined to determine the standard of review, ¿nding that the
impugned decision could not stand under either a reasonableness or
correctness standard. In Agraira and Kanthasamy, the Court determined
that a reasonableness standard applied. In all six cases, the Court arrived
at its own view of the appropriate interpretation of the treaty or statute
through its own analyses, effectively applying an intrusive review akin to
correctness.59
With little guidance from the Supreme Court after Dunsmuir, the
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal struggled with the question
of what standard of review to apply to decisions that interpreted ss. 96-98
of the IRPA, provisions that incorporate basic human rights protections
conferred by the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture.
Some Federal Court judges applied a correctness standard on the ground that
these provisions involved the interpretation of Canada’s obligations under
international treaties and were therefore matters of general law beyond the
decision-makers’ expertise.60 Others conducted reasonableness review61
based on their view that the presumption of reasonableness review had not
been rebutted.62 The Federal Court of Appeal also adopted different views
on this question. Applying Dunsmuir in Ezokola and Febles, the Federal
Court of Appeal determined that the appropriate standard of review for the
RPD’s interpretation of the scope of Article 1F(a) and (b) of the Refugee
Convention was correctness.63 Writing the majority judgment in Febles,
Justice Evans noted that while Article 1F(b) was incorporated into s. 98
of the IRPA, the presumption of reasonableness review that applies to a
58. 2015 SCC 61 [Kanthasamy].
59. For a similar assessment of Kanthasamy, Febles, B010 and Ezokola, see Vavilov v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 132 at para 37, Stratas JA.
60. See, for example, Portillo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 678 at paras 26-27
[Portillo].
61. See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v B380, 2012 FC 1334.
62. For a discussion of the conÀicting decisions, see Portillo, supra note 60 at paras 19-26 and
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v B472, 2013 FC 151 at paras 11-22.
63. Articles 1F(a) and (b) exclude from refugee protection under the Refugee Convention any person
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as de¿ned in the international instruments
drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; and (b) he has committed a serious non-political
crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee.
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tribunal’s interpretation of its home statute was rebutted. Article 1F(b)
was “a provision of an international Convention that should be interpreted
as uniformly as possible” and correctness review was “more likely than
reasonableness review to achieve this goal.”64 However, in B010, the
Federal Court of Appeal determined that the ID’s interpretation of a
provision of the IRPA providing for the inadmissibility to Canada of noncitizens engaging, in the context of transnational crime, in activity such
as “people smuggling, traf¿cking in persons or money laundering” was
reviewable on a reasonableness standard.65 It held that the presumption of
reasonableness review for a tribunal interpreting its home statute was not
rebutted by any of the correctness categories from Dunsmuir. While the
question may have been important, it was not outside the ID’s specialized
area of expertise.66 The Court of Appeal distinguished its ¿nding in Febles
that a correctness standard would ensure the uniform interpretation of
international conventions because B010 focused on the interpretation of
a statutory provision and because the uniformity concerns in Febles did
not apply since the relevant international instruments left to states the
implementation of their objectives.67 This reason for distinguishing Febles
is, with respect, unconvincing. In its decision in B010, the Supreme Court
noted that the refugee protection aspects of the IRPA served to discharge
Canada’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and the Smuggling
Protocol.68 Applying both the common law interpretive presumption
that legislation conforms with Canada’s international obligations and the
analogous statutory interpretive presumption set out in s. 3(3)(f) of the
IRPA, the Court gave these international obligations a meaning that played
a determining role in its interpretation of the inadmissibility provision.
Thus, the case for correctness review of the interpretation of statutory
provisions that serve to implement an international convention is as
compelling as that for the interpretation of the convention itself. In any
event, the Court of Appeal reasoned, the application of a reasonableness
standard would not lead to conÀicting interpretations because the range
of possible, acceptable outcomes on a reasonableness review of the
64. Hernandez Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 324 at para 24 [Febles
FCA]. See also Feimi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 325.
65. B010 v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FCA 87 [B010 FCA].
66. Ibid at paras 63-70.
67. Ibid at para 71.
68. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, 2241 UNTS 480
(entered into force 28 January 2004). The Supreme Court noted in B010, supra note 55, at para 53 that
the Smuggling Protocol was drafted with a view to the need of states parties to meet their obligations
under the Refugee Convention.
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ID’s interpretation of the IRPA could be narrow.69 In Majebi v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), contrary to its holding in
Febles and without adverting to the distinction it drew in B010, the Court
of Appeal upheld the Federal Court’s view that the RAD’s interpretation of
art 1E of the Refugee Convention should be reviewed on a reasonableness
standard.70 After noting the different opinions in Febles and B010 regarding
the standard of review applicable to questions of statutory interpretation
involving a consideration of international instruments,71 the Federal Court
decided that the presumption of reasonableness review was not displaced
—a conclusion with which the Court of Appeal agreed.72
In sum, the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal are now reviewing
decisions involving administrative decision-makers’ interpretation of
provisions of the IRPA that implement the basic human rights conferred
by international conventions on a reasonableness standard because in their
view, the presumption of reasonableness review of these decision-makers’
interpretations of their home statute has not been rebutted. While it has
intrusively reviewed such questions in the decade since Dunsmuir, the
Supreme Court has not yet expressly con¿rmed what standard of review
applies. In Part II of this article, we discuss why the correctness review
of administrative decisions involving certain categories of questions of
law is justi¿ed. Focusing on the refugee protection context, we argue
that administrative interpretations of provisions of the IRPA that serve to
implement human rights conferred by international conventions, including
fundamental rights to life, liberty,73 security of the person and freedom
from persecution, must be reviewed for correctness. We then demonstrate
that, consistent with the approach we are advocating, the Supreme Court

69. B010 FCA, supra note 65 at para 72. The Court of Appeal reiterated this view in Kanagendren v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FCA 86 at para 10, [2016] 1 FCR 428 [Kanagendren].
The parties disagreed on the standard applicable to a review of the ID’s interpretation of the term
“member” in s. 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, a section that parallels art 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention and
that designates as inadmissible on security grounds permanent residents or foreign nationals who are
members of an organization that engages in terrorism. The Court of Appeal held that nothing turned
on the standard of review because, based on the required textual, contextual and purposive analysis,
there was only a single reasonable interpretation of the term member.
70. 2016 FCA 274 [Majebi], leave to appeal to SCC refused.
71. Majebi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 14 at para 21. This was
also noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in B010, supra note 55 at para 24.
72. Ibid at para 22. But see Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Singh, 2016 FCA 300 at para
11, where the Federal Court of Appeal did not dismiss out of hand the argument that correctness
review of a decision of the RPD was required where issues of international law were involved. It held
instead that international law did not bear on the issue for review—the interpretation of the RPD’s
power, under s. 107(2) of the IRPA, to determine that there was no credible basis for a refugee claim.
73. Including fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of expression and belief.
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has in fact conducted an intrusive review of such interpretations both
before and, arguably, after Dunsmuir.
II. The case for correctness review
Thousands of administrative decisions are rendered in Canada each
year. When the courts are called upon to review these decisions on their
merits, the driving ethos that governs their review process is deference
to administrative decision-makers. This applies to a wide variety of
questions including pure questions of law. Courts presume that decisionmakers have the requisite expertise to interpret their enabling statutes or
those closely related to their mandate or subject-matter expertise. Yet,
the Supreme Court has carved out speci¿c types of questions of law that
demand a non-deferential approach on judicial review. With respect to
these questions, courts determine whether an administrative decisionmaker’s determinations are correct. If the reviewing court disagrees with
a decision-maker’s decision on a question of law, the correctness standard
permits the court to replace the “erroneous” interpretation with its own. As
noted in Part I, the Supreme Court has explicitly designated four categories
of questions of law that mandate a correctness standard. The ¿rst category
includes constitutional questions regarding the division of powers and
other constitutional issues. A second category concerns questions of law
that are both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and
that are outside the expertise of the administrative decision-maker. The
third category focuses on true questions of jurisdiction or vires. The last
category relates to questions of law regarding the jurisdictional lines
between competing specialized tribunals.
Canadian jurists have clearly articulated the sound reasons that justify
correctness review of such signi¿cant questions of law. Correctness review
of administrative decisions dealing with questions of constitutional law,
including those involving the division of powers set out in the Constitution
Act, 1867, is justi¿ed primarily by the constitutional role of Canada’s
superior courts as interpreters of the Constitution.74 Correctness review
of true questions of jurisdiction or vires also has a constitutional source.
The judicature provisions in ss. 96 to 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867
guarantee judicial review of administrative action with regard to “the

74.

Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 58.
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de¿nition and enforcement of jurisdictional limits” in order to maintain
the rule of law.75
Another reason for correctness review is the need for consistency
and certainty in the interpretation of statutes. This need is particularly
pressing where different decision-makers sitting on different panels within
an administrative agency arrive at divergent interpretations of the statute
they administer.76 A failure to ensure consistency leads to uncertainty, may
offend the rule of law by allowing the meaning of a law to depend on the
identity of the particular decision-maker and can erode public con¿dence
in the administration of justice.77 The need for consistency also engages
reviewing courts’ law-making (or law-settling) role to provide de¿nitive
and binding conclusions about the meaning and scope of important legal
rights, provisions or principles.78 Correctness, in this context, functions
to safeguard “a basic consistency in the fundamental legal order of our
country.”79 Questions of law that are both of central importance to the legal
system as a whole and outside the expertise of the administrative decisionmaker are signi¿cant matters that require consistent interpretation. While
various questions could arguably qualify as questions of law of central
importance,80 our claim in this article is that questions of law relating to
the scope of basic human rights guarantees conferred by domestic human
rights codes or international human rights conventions implemented
by domestic laws should be included in this category. Indeed, given its
broad application in the legal system and its primacy over other laws,
human rights legislation has been designated by the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions as being quasi-constitutional in nature,81 a source of
“fundamental law.”82
75. Ibid at para 31; Crevier v Attorney General of Quebec, [1981] 2 SCR 220 at 237-38, 127 DLR
(3d) 1. But see Alberta Teachers’ Association, supra note 7 at para 43, where Rothstein J notes that
the constitutional guarantee of judicial review with regard to the de¿nition and enforcement of
jurisdictional limits does not necessarily mandate correctness review.
76. See, e.g., Starson v Swayze, 2003 SCC 32 at para 110
77. Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 at para 9.
78. Ibid.
79. Mowat, supra note 27 at para 22.
80. Though as discussed at 9-10 above, the number of cases in which the Supreme Court has
identi¿ed such questions since Dunsmuir appears rather limited.
81. Québec (Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail) v Caron,
2018 SCC 3 at paras 32-34; McCormick v Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39 at para 17;
New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc, 2008 SCC
45 at para 19; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Montréal
(City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Boisbriand (City),
2000 SCC 27 at para 27.
82. Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Communauté
urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30 at para 20.

 7KH'DOKRXVLH/DZ-RXUQDO

We argue that a non-deferential approach to judicial review is
required for questions of law arising from administrative decision-makers’
interpretation of statutory provisions that serve to implement human rights
conferred in international conventions that bind Canada. In the refugee
protection context, these include administrative decisions that require, for
example, the interpretation of what constitutes persecution, the scope or
meaning of one of the grounds for persecution, or the exclusion clauses
prescribed in the Refugee Convention and incorporated into Canadian law
through sections 96 to 98 of the IRPA. Section 96 incorporates article 1A(2)
of the Refugee Convention which de¿nes who quali¿es as a refugee.83
Section 98 incorporates article 1F of the Refugee Convention and sets
out who is excluded from refugee status by virtue of their commission
of certain criminal activity. As recognized by the Supreme Court of
Canada, such protections are at the core of the purposes underlying the
Refugee Convention: the international community’s commitment “to the
assurance of basic human rights without discrimination.”84 In addition,
section 97 of the IRPA incorporates, explicitly, protections arising from
the Convention Against Torture. Seen holistically, such provisions are
basic or fundamental in the sense that by failing to afford to protection
claimants the full measure of protection guaranteed by the terms of these
instruments, Canada would expose them to treatment that threatens their
life, liberty and security of the person. Given the serious implications of
the erroneous interpretation of statutory provisions that implement these
international human rights guarantees, there is a compelling argument that
such questions are of central importance to the legal system as a whole and
that courts be responsible for establishing their correct interpretation. These
provisions are of central importance because they implement human rights
obligations that are binding on Canada at international law. As further
developed below, Courts must ensure their consistent interpretation,
83. Questions of law connected to the de¿nition of who quali¿es as a refugee include de¿ning
the scope of key terms and concepts arising explicitly or implicitly from art 1A(2) and s. 96, such
as persecution, state protection, internal Àight alternatives, as well the enumerated grounds of
persecution—namely race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group and political
opinion. For example, as discussed below, the Supreme Court of Canada provided de¿nitions for
“political opinion” and “membership in a particular social group” in Canada (AG) v Ward, [1993] 2
SCR 689 at 739, 746-747, 103 DLR (4th) 1. The Court in Ward also discussed at length the concept
of persecution and the notion of state complicity. See ibid at 709-726. It is worth noting that the
de¿nitions that the Supreme Court formulates can give rise to different interpretations by lower courts
and administrative decision-makers requiring clari¿cation from the Supreme Court or the Federal
Court of Appeal. See, e.g., Klinko v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 FC
327, 179 FTR 253.
84. Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982 at para
46, 160 DLR (4th) 193 [Pushpanathan].
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particularly where several different administrative decision-makers share
responsibility for their interpretation at ¿rst instance.
Questions of law of central importance, as noted by the Supreme
Court, require uniform and consistent answers. In the refugee protection
context, such answers are provided by national courts, which play a key
role in ensuring the domestic application of the provisions of the Refugee
Convention and other international legal instruments protecting human
rights. As Geoff Gilbert observes, while the Convention is international, its
implementation occurs at the domestic level:85 “There is no International
Refugee Court or Tribunal to oversee treaty implementation. This means
that protection of refugees through the 1951 Convention is dependent on
domestic legislation and national judges.”86 Analogously, with regards
to the domestic application of the International Covenant on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has stated:
Within the limits of the appropriate exercise of their functions of
judicial review, courts should take account of Covenant rights where
this is necessary to ensure that the state’s conduct is consistent with
its obligations under the Covenant. Neglect by the courts of this
responsibility is incompatible with the principle of the rule of law, which
must always be taken to include respect for international human rights
obligations.87

The correctness standard is an essential tool for courts to properly discharge
these responsibilities. By contrast, reasonableness is a deferential standard
animated by the principle that “certain questions that come before
administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one speci¿c, particular
result.”88 Reasonableness review of the interpretation of statutory provisions
that implement basic international human rights thus sits uncomfortably
with these norms’ proclaimed universality. Justice John Evans, writing for
a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal, recognized in Febles v. Canada
that while art 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention was incorporated into s. 98 of
the IRPA, the RPD’s home statute, the presumption of reasonableness was
rebutted because it remained “a provision of an international Convention

85. Geoff Gilbert, “Running Scared Since 9/11: Refugees, UNHCR and the Purposive Approach to
Treaty Interpretation” in James C Simeon, ed, Critical Issues in International Refugee Law: Strategies
Toward Interpretive Harmony (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 93.
86. Ibid.
87. General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Charter, UNCESCROR, 1998, E/
C12/1998/24.
88. Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 47.
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that should be interpreted as uniformly as possible” and correctness review
was “more likely than reasonableness review to achieve this goal.”89
The national courts of other countries have acknowledged that they
are responsible for settling the meaning of the provisions of certain
international human rights treaties. In R v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex parte Adan; R v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Aitseguer,90 a statutory provision allowed the UK’s
Secretary of State to send an asylum seeker to a third country provided
that he certi¿ed, inter alia, that in his opinion the government of that third
country would not send the asylum seeker to another country “otherwise
than in accordance with” the Refugee Convention. The Secretary of State
claimed that to comply with that provision, it was suf¿cient for third
countries (in this case, Germany and France) to adopt an interpretation of
the Convention that was, in his view, “reasonably open” to those countries.
Unlike most contracting states to the Refugee Convention, including the
UK, Germany and France limited “persecution” to conduct attributable to
the state. The House of Lords was asked to consider whether there was “a
true and international meaning” of art 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention
or “simply a range of interpretations some of which the Secretary of State
may be entitled to regard as legitimate and others not.”91 Lord Steyn,
whose views were accepted by a majority of the House of Lords, held that:
…[A]s in the case of other multilateral treaties, the Refugee Convention
must be given an independent meaning derivable from the sources
mentioned in arts 31 and 32 [of the Vienna Convention on the
Interpretation of Treaties] and without taking colour from distinctive
features of the legal system of any individual contracting state. In
principle therefore there can only be one true interpretation of a treaty.
If there is disagreement on the meaning of the Refugee Convention,
it can be resolved by the International Court of Justice: art 38 [of the
Refugee Convention]. It has, however, never been asked to make such a
ruling. The prospect of a reference to the International Court of Justice
is remote. In practice it is left to national courts, faced with a material
disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to resolve it. But in doing so
it must search, untrammelled by notions of its national legal culture, for
the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty. And there
can only be one true meaning.92

Because there can be only one true interpretation of the scope of the
protection that is conferred by the Refugee Convention and other
89. Febles FCA, supra note 64 at para 24.
90. [2000] UKHL 67, [2001] 2 AC 477 [Ex parte Adan citing to AC].
91. Ibid at 515, Lord Steyn.
92. Ibid at 516-517, Lord Steyn [emphasis added].
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international conventions implemented in key provisions of the IRPA,
absent a binding interpretation by a competent international tribunal, it
is the role of the Federal Court of Appeal and, ultimately, the Supreme
Court of Canada, to provide that interpretation in judgments that bind
administrative decision-makers under the IRPA.
The imperative of giving a uniform and consistent meaning to
provisions of the IRPA that implement basic human rights conferred in
international conventions makes their interpretation a question of law of
central importance to the legal system. However, this imperative does not
Àow solely from the source of these provisions in conventional international
law. The IRPA is interpreted and applied by several administrative decisionmakers, including the IRB’s RPD and RAD and PRRA of¿cers working
within Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. Divergent lines of
authority regarding basic elements of the Refugee Convention have arisen93
and the creation of the RAD has not resolved this problem by ensuring
their consistent interpretation.94 Moreover, no formal mechanism exists
to ensure that PRRA of¿cers follow an interpretation of the provisions at
issue that is consistent with that followed by the RPD members and RAD
panels. Accordingly, the answer to questions key to establishing the scope
of protection under the Refugee Convention, such as how state protection
must be assessed, may ultimately depend on the identity of the adjudicator.
Under the rule of law, one of the twin pillars that underlie our law of judicial
review, the meaning of a law should not differ depending on the identity
of the decision-maker.95 While the Supreme Court has often repeated that
conÀicting lines of authority do not, on their own, warrant correctness
review, it has done so in decisions involving pipeline arbitrations,96 unjust
dismissal adjudications,97 whether a minister can be represented by nonlawyers before a speci¿c tribunal98 and the availability of an income
93. See Jamie Chai Yun Liew, “Creating Higher Burdens: The Presumption of State Protection in
Democratic Countries” (2009) 26:2 Refuge 207.
94. See Jamie Chai Yun Liew, “Denying Refugee Protection to LGBTQ and Marginalized Persons:
A Retrospective Look at State Protection in Canadian Refugee Law” (2017) 29 CJWL 290. While
the IRPA, supra note 3, s 171(c) confers on decisions of three-member panels of the RAD the same
precedential value for the RPD or one-member RAD panels as a decision of an appeal court has for
a trial court, divergences have continued: see Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Vavilov,
[2017] SCCA No 352 (Factum of the Intervener Canadian Council for Refugees) at paras 7-14, online:
<https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/37748/FM110_Intervener_CanadianCouncil-for-Refugees.pdf>.
95. Wilson, supra note 52 at paras 84-87, Moldaver, Côté and Brown JJ; Taub v Investment Dealers
Association of Canada, 2009 ONCA 628 at para 67; CHRC, supra note 31 at paras 86-87, Rowe and
Côté JJ.
96. Smith v Alliance Pipeline, 2011 SCC 160 at para 38.
97. Wilson, supra note 52 at para 17.
98. Barreau du Québec v Quebec (AG), 2017 SCC 56 at para 19.
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replacement indemnity for disabled workers during a plant closure.99 The
interests at stake in such decisions are fundamentally different than those
present in the refugee protection context. Where different decision-makers
adopt different interpretations of the scope of refugee protection under the
IRPA, one refugee claimant may receive refugee protection while another
presenting an identical claim may be refused protection and returned to
his or her country of origin to face persecution, torture and possibly death.
Given the momentous impact of refugee protection decisions on the life,
liberty and security of the person of protection claimants, the existence of
divergent interpretations of these key provisions is arbitrary and antithetical
to the rule of law, which demands that the inconsistencies be immediately
resolved through correctness review. In this context, it is impermissible
that administrative decision-makers be allowed to “work inconsistencies
pure” over time100 and in so doing, put protection claimants’ lives at risk.
Moreover, Parliament’s provision, in section 74(d) of the IRPA, of an
exceptional appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal on questions certi¿ed as
serious and of general importance is an objective indicator that there are
questions of statutory interpretation for which judicial intervention on a
correctness standard is justi¿ed.101
To warrant correctness review, the interpretation of a statutory
provision must, in addition to being a question of general law of central
importance to the legal system as a whole, fall outside the specialized
expertise of the decision-maker.102 On numerous occasions, the Supreme
Court has identi¿ed the notion of expertise as a relative concept.103
A deferential approach to the review of an administrative decision is
99. Domtar Inc v Quebec (Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), [1993] 2
SCR 756, 105 DLR (4th) 385.
100. Paul Daly, “The Principle of Stare decisis in Canadian Administrative Law” (2015) 49:3 RJTUM
757 at 775-777 [Daly].
101. Ibid at para 38, citing Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at
para 35.
102. See University of Calgary, supra note 47 at para 20.
103. See Dr. Q, supra note 19, where the Court stated, at para 28, that relative expertise recognizes
“that legislatures will sometimes remit an issue to a decision-making body that has particular topical
expertise or is adept in the determination of particular issues. Where this is so, courts will seek to
respect this legislative choice when conducting judicial review. Yet expertise is a relative concept, not
an absolute one. Greater deference will be called for only where the decision-making body is, in some
way, more expert than the courts and the question under consideration is one that falls within the scope
of this greater expertise”; Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop, [1993] 1 SCR 554 at 584-585, 100
DLR (4th) 658 [Mossop]; Pezim v British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 SCR 557 at
592, 114 DLR (4th) 385; Pushpanathan, supra note 84 at para 33-34; Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para
68; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals,
2011 SCC 59 at paras 42 and 53; Rogers Communications, supra note 37 at para 15; Capilano, supra
note 31 at paras 66, 84-86, Côté and Brown JJ dissenting; University of Calgary, supra note 47 at paras
20 and 22.
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indicated only when the decision-maker has greater or “special” expertise
relative to the reviewing court with respect to the particular issue before
it.104 Is the scope of the protections conferred in sections 96-98 of the IRPA
a question of law that falls outside the relative expertise of the various
federal decision-makers charged with interpreting these provisions? The
IRPA provides that only 10% of members of the RAD need to be members
of at least ¿ve years standing of the bar of a province and does not impose
similar requirements for members of the RPD tasked with deciding refugee
protection claims at ¿rst instance.105 Parliament has thus made it clear
that the majority of decision-makers do not need to possess formal legal
education and be a member of the bar. Similarly, other federal employees
responsible for interpreting and applying provisions of the IRPA, including
of¿cers in the Canada Border Services Agency (under the supervision of
the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),106 of¿cers
within Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (under the
supervision of the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship),
as well as embassy/consular of¿cials (under the authority of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs) are not statutorily required to be experienced lawyers
or notaries.107 Where questions of law concern the scope of fundamental
human rights protections that impact refugee claimants’ right to life,
liberty and security of the person, it is doubtful that these various of¿cials
have, relatively, more expertise than those of the courts in interpreting
key IRPA provisions and the international conventions they implement.
While there are sound reasons to presume that administrative decisionmakers have expertise in the interpretation of their enabling legislation
or closely related statutes, this presumption is rebutted here. By expressly
providing that most members of the RAD, the refugee protection tribunal
with the greatest claim to expertise, need not be experienced lawyers or
notaries, Parliament has clearly signalled that at an institutional level, it is
not relying on that tribunal to expertly and de¿nitively interpret the scope

104. See Gerald Heckman, “Developments in Administrative Law: The 2014–2015 Term” (2016) 72
SCLR (2d) 1 at 35-36.
105. Or at least ¿ve years standing at the Chambres des notaires du Québec. See IRPA, supra note 3,
s 153(4).
106. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is responsible for several aspects of
IRPA including examinations at ports of entry and acts of enforcement including arrest, detention and
removal. IRPA, supra note 3, s 4(2).
107. Canadian visa of¿ces operating abroad process applications for refugee status and permanent
residence. Refugee applicants outside of Canada may apply for refugee status and permanent status if
they have been referred by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a designated referral
organization or a private sponsorship group. See <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/services/refugees/help-outside-canada.html>.
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of basic human rights guarantees de¿ned in an international convention.108
Indeed, as noted below, Parliament’s choice to retain this feature of the
Immigration Act when it enacted the IRPA, while fully cognizant of the
Supreme Court’s earlier ¿nding, in Pushpanathan v. Canada, that it
attracted correctness review for such questions, strongly supports the
inference that it intended correctness review.
As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court has narrowly de¿ned the
correctness category of questions of law of central importance. The
interpretation of sections 96-98 of the IRPA is speci¿c to the regime set
out under that statute and, having arguably no precedential value outside
of that context, could be held not to be a question of law of central
importance to the legal system. Moreover, by analogy to Justice Abella’s
reasons in Saguenay, it could be said that the interpretation of these key
provisions is the “daily fare” of RPD and RAD members as well as PRRA
of¿cers and does not fall outside of their specialized expertise. If the Court
were to exclude the only potentially relevant correctness category through
such reasoning, it would still be possible to argue that the presumption of
reasonableness review for decisions involving the interpretation of these
provisions is rebutted by a contextual analysis. While a majority of the
Court has sought to con¿ne it to a subordinate role, to be applied sparingly
in exceptional cases, a contextual analysis strongly supports correctness
review in this context. In Pushpanathan, a pre-Dunsmuir decision, the
Supreme Court applied a contextual analysis and expressly adopted
correctness as the applicable standard of review. The case concerned the
scope of article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention, which excludes from
refugee protection persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons
for considering that they have been guilty of “acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.”
As part of its full contextual analysis of the appropriate standard of
review, the majority considered the nature of the question, the relative
expertise of the IRB’s Convention Refugee Determination Division, the
purpose of the Refugee Convention and of article 1F(c) and the statutory
mechanism of review. First, the majority’s characterization of the nature
of the question was key to its adoption of a correctness standard. The
scope of the exclusion clause was a question at the core of the human
rights purpose underlying the Refugee Convention: the international
community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without
discrimination.109 Because it could result in the disquali¿cation of
108. Pushpanathan, supra note 84 at para 57.
109. Ibid, at para 46.
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many refugee claimants from protection under the Refugee Convention,
the question was (and had been certi¿ed as such by the Federal Court)
a serious question of general importance, which could have applied to
numerous future cases and been of great precedential value. Second, on
the question of the scope of protection under the Refugee Convention, the
Immigration and Refugee Board enjoyed no relative expertise compared
to reviewing courts since only 10% of Board members were required to
be lawyers and there was no requirement that there be a lawyer on every
panel.110 It was thus unthinkable to repose “the broad de¿nition of basic
human rights guarantees,” a question easily separable from the facts and
of wide precedential value, exclusively in the hands of a Board whose
expertise lay mainly in assessing the nature of the risk of persecution faced
by refugee claimants if returned to their country of origin.111 The Court
further observed that the Board’s expertise in connection with human
rights was far less developed relative to that of the courts (or even human
rights tribunals).112 Third, the Court determined that the purpose of the
Refugee Convention and its exclusion clauses was to confer minimum
human rights protection. Far from engaging in the polycentric decisionmaking that attracted judicial deference, the Board’s adjudicative function
sought to vindicate a set of relatively static human rights and ensure the
protection of those who fell within the prescribed categories.113 Finally,
Parliament’s intent, as revealed in its decision to provide in s. 83(1) of the
Immigration Act114 (now s. 74(d) of the IRPA) an “exceptional appeal” to
the Federal Court of Appeal on serious questions of general importance,
was that the reviewing court be permitted to substitute its own opinion for
that of the IRB.115 Recently writing for a majority of the Supreme Court
in Kanthasamy,116 Justice Abella held that certi¿ed questions were “not
decisive” of the standard of review and that the fact that the reviewing
judge considered the question to be of general importance was “relevant,
but not determinative.” This may be so, but the statutory provision at
issue in Kanthasamy—a broad ministerial discretion to exempt a foreign
national from the ordinary requirements of the IRPA on humanitarian
and compassionate grounds—is very different from sections 96-98. As
110. Immigration Act, RSC, 1985, c I-2, s 61(2) [Immigration Act], now IRPA, supra note 3, s 153(4).
111. Pushpanathan, supra note 84 at para 47.
112. Ibid at paras 45-47.
113. Ibid at para 48.
114. Immigration Act, supra note 110. Section 83(1) provided that an appeal to the Court of Appeal
was available where the Federal Court of Canada judge hearing the judicial review application had
certi¿ed that a serious question of general importance was involved and stated the question.
115. Pushpanathan, supra note 84 at para 43.
116. Kanthasamy, supra note 58 at para 44.
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indicated in Pushpanathan, where the decision under review involves the
interpretation of statutory provisions implementing core aspects of the
Refugee Convention that de¿ne basic human rights guarantees against
refoulement to persecution, Parliament’s provision of an exceptional
appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal should be read as strongly indicating
its intention that the decision be reviewed on a correctness basis.117
Several other Supreme Court decisions strongly support the use of a
correctness standard of review for decisions involving broad questions of
law in the refugee law context. In these, the Court effectively conducted
correctness review even though no standard was expressly identi¿ed.118
Five years before Pushpanathan, in its 1993 decision in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Ward, the Supreme Court provided, among other things, an
interpretation of the concept of a “well-founded fear of persecution,” the
notions of state protection and complicity, as well as key de¿nitions for
“political opinion” and “membership in a particular social group,” grounds
for persecution included in the Refugee Convention’s de¿nition of a
refugee and incorporated into the Immigration Act.119 The issue of whether
the asylum seeker’s conduct manifested a political opinion was raised
for the ¿rst time before the Supreme Court; it was not raised before the
IRB or lower courts.120 The Court reviewed several de¿nitions articulated
by several prominent refugee law jurists. After settling on the de¿nition
posited by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, the Court made two further re¿nements
of its own. Although the Court did not engage in a standard of review
analysis or explicitly identify a standard of review, the manner in which

117. With respect, Justice Abella’s view unduly discounts how strongly the IRPA’s provision of an
exceptional appeal supports an inference that Parliament recognized that correctness review would be
appropriate for certain questions. In contrast, the four dissenting judges in Capilano, supra note 31,
gave due weight to appeal provisions of this nature. Section 470 of the Municipal Government Act,
RSA 2000, c M-26 granted a statutory right of appeal with leave to the Court of Queen’s Bench on a
“question of law or jurisdiction” where a judge “is of the opinion that the appeal involves a question of
law or jurisdiction of suf¿cient importance to merit an appeal and has a reasonable chance of success.”
The dissenting judges read this as a signal by the Legislature of its intention that important questions
of law and jurisdiction that transcend the particular context of a disputed assessment and have broader
implications for the municipal assessment regime be treated differently than other questions and
reviewed for correctness. Noting that s. 470 was similar to the appeal provisions under the IRPA, the
dissent endorsed Justice Bastarache’s reasoning, in Pushpanathan, that the exceptional appeal to the
Federal Court of Appeal on questions of general importance indicated Parliament’s intention that a
review of such questions be conducted on a correctness standard. Their reasoning on this point has been
endorsed by leading academic observers: see David Mullan, “Recent Developments in Administrative
Law—2015–16” in Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, Administrative Law
Conference 2016 Course Materials, at 26. See also Daly, supra note 100 at 775.
118. Pushpanathan, supra note 84.
119. Ward, supra note 83 at 709-717, 721-726; 726-750.
120. Ibid at 745-746.
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the Ward Court formulated the de¿nitions of these grounds for persecution
strongly suggests the application of a correctness standard.
Since Dunsmuir, the Court has approached similar exercises in
statutory interpretation in the refugee protection context as it did in Ward
and Pushpanathan. In Ezokola, the Court formulated a new legal test
with respect to determining an individual’s complicity in the commission
of crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity for the
purposes of Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention and s. 98 of the
IRPA.121 Notably, the Court articulated its function on judicial review as
follows: “The task for this Court is to determine what test for complicity
will be applied by the art. 1F(a) decision maker.”122 It was not assessing
whether the IRB’s interpretation of art. 1F(a) was reasonable, but asserting
its responsibility to determine the test for complicity. The Ezokola Court
went on to articulate the proper test by examining the purposes of the
Refugee Convention and art. 1F(a), the role of the IRB, the international
law to which art. 1F(a) expressly refers, the approach to complicity under
art. 1F(a) taken by other state parties to the Refugee Convention and the
extensive international criminal jurisprudence.123 As in Ward, the Court
in Ezokola did not conduct a standard of review analysis or explicitly
articulate the applicable standard of review. Rather, it undertook its own
legal analysis of the legal question—the very de¿nition of correctness
review.124 As it did in Ward and Pushpanathan, the Court exercised its
law-making role rather than determining whether the legal de¿nitions
arrived at by the administrative decision-makers were reasonable. Put
another way, by clearly identifying what the law was, the Court conducted
a correctness review.
The Supreme Court of Canada next engaged in a very similar implied
“correctness” review in Febles v. Canada. As in Ezokola, the majority in
Febles abstained from addressing the appropriate standard of review for
the question of law before the Court. Febles involved the interpretation
of article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention, which excludes persons from
eligibility for refugee protection where there are serious reasons for
considering that such individuals have committed a serious non-political
crime outside the country of refuge prior to their admission to that country
as a refugee. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court undertook a textual
analysis of Article 1F(b), an examination of the context (including

121.
122.
123.
124.

Ezokola, supra note 53.
Ibid at para 28.
Ibid at para 30.
Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 50.
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Canadian and foreign case law and the travaux préparatoires to the
Refugee Convention), and an evaluation of the object and purpose of the
Refugee Convention as a whole and speci¿cally of article 1F(b). The Court
agreed with the IRB’s interpretation of the provision as well as the Federal
Court of Canada’s and Court of Appeals’ opinions. Its agreement with
the IRB’s interpretation of article 1F(b) does not signal reasonableness
review. A reviewing court that undertakes its own analysis of a question of
interpretation on correctness review may well come to the same result as
that of the administrative decision-maker in the ¿rst instance. Indeed, in
Febles, the Federal Court of Appeal, which expressly applied a correctness
standard of review, also af¿rmed the IRB’s interpretation.125
We have argued in this Part that decisions involving the interpretation
of provisions of the IRPA that serve to implement human rights conferred
by international conventions, including the Refugee Convention, should be
reviewed on a correctness standard of review because they raise questions
of law of central importance to the legal system and outside the relative
expertise of the administrative decision-makers. As noted by the Supreme
Court, questions of general law of central importance require uniform
and consistent answers. In the refugee protection context, such answers
are provided by national courts, which, absent a binding interpretation
by a competent international tribunal, play a central role in ensuring the
domestic application of the provisions of the Refugee Convention and
other international legal instruments protecting human rights. In light of
the serious impact of refugee protection decisions on the protection of
claimants’ life, liberty and security of the person, the existence of divergent
interpretations of these provisions is arbitrary and contrary to the rule of law,
which requires that the inconsistencies be immediately resolved through
correctness review. By expressly providing in IRPA that refugee protection
claims need not be decided by experienced lawyers or notaries, and
cognizant that this feature of the Immigration Act had attracted correctness
review in Pushpanathan, Parliament clearly indicated that questions of
law involving the interpretation of provisions of the IRPA that implement
basic human rights conferred by international conventions are outside the
relative expertise of the various administrative decision-makers under
IRPA. As demonstrated in Pushpanathan, a contextual analysis would also
rebut the presumption that administrative decision-makers’ interpretation
of their enabling statute be reviewed for reasonableness. The Supreme
Court’s approach to the interpretation of these provisions, both before and
after Dunsmuir, is to supply its own legal analysis of the questions at issue.
125. Febles FCA, supra note 64 at paras 24-25.
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While the case for a correctness standard is, in our view, overwhelming, the
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal have reviewed administrative
interpretations of provisions of the IRPA incorporating key elements of
the Refugee Convention on a reasonableness basis.126 Part III explores the
perils of such an approach.
III. The perils of reasonableness review
As noted in Part I, as a single standard of review that takes its colour
from the context, reasonableness has often been applied by reviewing
courts to intensively scrutinize tribunals’ interpretation of their enabling
statutes. Accordingly, the Federal Court of Appeal has dismissed concerns
that applying the reasonableness standard to the review of administrative
decision-makers’ interpretations of the IRPA could give rise to conÀicting
interpretations of its provisions, an unlikely result because the range
of possible, acceptable outcomes for the interpretation of statutory
provisions could be narrow. In other words, since there is likely only a
single reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision, applying a
reasonableness standard would lead to the same outcome as correctness
review.127 Former Federal Court of Appeal Justice John Evans has noted
that deference, which “assumes that there is no uniquely correct answer”
to a question of statutory interpretation, does not arise “in the absence of a
range of reasonable options defensible on the law from which the tribunal
could choose.”128 This, in his view, is a common occurrence:
In theory, a reviewing court may conclude on the basis of a textual,
contextual and purposive analysis that the legislation admits of a range
of reasonable choices from which the tribunal could select. In practice,
however, reviewing courts somewhat rarely reach this conclusion: the
principles of statutory interpretation are designed to enable the interpreter,
whether tribunal or court, to determine the legislative intent in enacting
the provision in question. In other words, once the court embarks on its
own interpretation of the statute to determine the reasonableness of the
tribunal’s decision, there seems often to be little room for deference.129

126. See Majebi, supra note 71.
127. See Kanagendren, supra note 69 at para 10, where the Court of Appeal concluded that “nothing
turns on the standard of review” because “on the basis of the required textual, contextual and purposive
analysis conducted below, there is only a single reasonable interpretation of the word ‘member’” in s.
34(1)(f) of the IRPA. See also B010 FCA, supra note 65 at para 72.
128. John M Evans, “Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Matter?” (2014) 27
Can J Admin L & Prac 101 at 108 [Evans].
129. Ibid at 109.
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This position is certainly supported by Agraira130 and Kanthasamy,131 two
decisions in which the Supreme Court conducted a reasonableness review
of the decision-maker’s interpretation of provisions of the IRPA that could
be mistaken for correctness review. Rather than focusing on the decisionmakers’ reasons to decide whether their interpretations fell within a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible in respect of the facts and the
law, it launched into its own exercise in statutory interpretation and came
to its own view of the meaning of the statutory provision.
But things are not always so straightforward, as illustrated in the
Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Vavilov v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration).132 Vavilov involved a review of the decision
of the Registrar of citizenship to cancel Vavilov’s Canadian citizenship
on the grounds that, though he was born in Canada, he was not a citizen
because his parents, who had operated in Canada as Russian spies, were
at that time “employee[s] of a foreign government” under s. 3(2)(a) of
the Citizenship Act. A key element in the interpretation of that provision
was that it had been enacted with a view to implement the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations133 into Canadian law and was to be
interpreted in accordance with that international treaty as well as with the
customary international law principle of jus soli. Justice Stratas applied a
reasonableness standard to the Registrar of citizenship’s interpretation of
the Citizenship Act because, in his view, the presumption of reasonableness
had not been rebutted. Noting that the standard of review debate was “not
of great practical import,” he succinctly summarized the Supreme Court’s
approach to the judicial review of interpretations of the IRPA as follows:
On issues of statutory interpretation in the immigration context, the
Supreme Court recently has also been applying reasonableness in
an exacting way. Not surprisingly, because of the presumption of
reasonableness, it is acting under the reasonableness standard of review,
but it assesses the administrative decision-maker’s interpretation of a
statutory provision closely, in fact sometimes in a manner that appears
to be akin to correctness: see, e.g., Kanthasamy (…); B010 (…); Febles
(…); Ezokola (…). In fact, it has been a while since the Supreme Court
has afforded a decision-maker in the immigration context much of a
margin of appreciation on statutory interpretation issues.134

130. Supra note 57.
131. Supra note 58.
132. 2017 FCA 132 [Vavilov FCA].
133. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 24 April 1963, 500 UNTS 241 (entered into force
19 March 1967).
134. Vavilov FCA, supra note 132 at para 37 [case citations omitted].
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Applying the principles of statutory interpretation and looking at the
text, context and purpose of s. 3(2)(a), Justice Stratas determined that
“employee[s] in Canada of a foreign government” could include only
those who enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.135 As Vavilov’s parents did not,
they were subject to Canadian laws. In the majority’s view, “a child born
to parents subject to Canadian laws is a person born in Canada for the
purposes of Canadian citizenship laws and, thus, under paragraph 3(1)(a),
becomes a Canadian citizen upon birth in Canada.”136
Justice Gleason’s dissent in Vavilov illustrates that in some cases,
the selection of a reasonableness standard of review could make all the
difference. Unlike the majority, she believed that the context and purpose
of the statutory provision did not “clearly necessitate” adopting the
majority’s interpretation of the text of the provision over the Registrar’s
broader view of the meaning of “employee of a foreign government.” She
would have allowed the Registrar’s decision to stand:
To conclude otherwise is to engage in correctness review as in such
circumstances the reviewing court is substituting its views for those of
the tribunal on the basis of disagreement as to the correct interpretation
of the provision in question, even though the interpretation of the
administrative decision-maker is defensible as a rational textual
interpretation that is not necessarily negated by the context or purpose
of the provision.137

Had Justice Gleason written the majority judgment, the Registrar would
have been free to adopt either one of two very different interpretations
of the Citizenship Act. There is no reason in principle why such a result
could not obtain when courts are reviewing decisions involving the
interpretation of the IRPA. In Pushpanathan, for example, the Supreme
Court was divided on the correct interpretation of the term “acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” in art 1F(c) of the
Refugee Convention.138 Could it have been argued that the competing
interpretations offered by Justices Bastarache and Cory fell within a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes? In that context and for such a provision,
which determines whether or not a refugee claimant bene¿ts from the
basic human rights protections afforded by the Refugee Convention, a
¿nding that several inconsistent interpretations are reasonable and open to
135.
136.
137.
138.

Supra note 133.
Vavilov FCA, supra note 132 at para 46.
Ibid at para 96.
See also Febles, supra note 54 where the Court divided on the interpretation of art 1 F(b).
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adjudicators cannot be countenanced. The scope of universal protections
against refoulement cannot depend on whether a refugee claimant has the
good fortune of having her claim decided by an adjudicator who happens
to subscribe to a narrower view of the exclusion clause rather than a
broader yet equally reasonable alternative interpretation. The provisions
of an international convention de¿ning the scope of basic human rights
protections can only have one true meaning.
ReÀecting on the nature of reasonableness review of an administrative
tribunal’s interpretation of its enabling statute, Justice Evans observed
that it would differ from correctness or appellate review in three ways.
It is instructive to consider whether these differences would apply to the
review of a decision-maker’s interpretations of ss. 96-98 of the IRPA.
First, a court conducting reasonableness review must take seriously the
full reasons offered by a tribunal justifying its interpretation as a “judicial
recognition that the legislature has entrusted to the tribunal primary
responsibility for interpreting its enabling legislation whether for reasons
of relative expertise, cost or speed of decision-making or all three.”139 As
argued in Part II, Parliament’s inclusion in the IRPA of an exceptional
appeal for serious questions of general importance together with a
statutory provision that dispenses of the need for adjudicators to have
formal legal training is clearly inconsistent with an intention to entrust
them with primary responsibility for the interpretation of provisions of
the IRPA that serve to implement the basic human rights conferred by
an international convention. Second, Justice Evans suggests that courts
conducting reasonableness review should pay attention to the tribunal’s
view of the consequences on the “ef¿cacy and coherence of the statutory
scheme of interpreting a provision in one way rather than another”:140
Tribunals’ knowledge of the substantive regulatory issues arising from
the program they administer and their familiarity with the design,
detail and operation of the statutory scheme will have informed their
interpretation and provide a perspective that courts generally will not
have.141

In interpreting ss. 96-98 of the IRPA, which directly incorporate provisions
of the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture, the key
question is the scope of the basic human rights protections that States
Parties have agreed to confer on protection claimants through these treaties.
It is questionable whether, in applying the refugee de¿nition to the facts of
139. Evans, supra note 128 at 110.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
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numerous individual claims, decision-makers will gain an advantage over
reviewing courts in applying the principles of treaty interpretation to the
provisions of international human rights conventions. Third, Justice Evans
notes, reasonableness review means that reviewing courts should be open
to the possibility that the statutory text, context and purpose may not “all
point unequivocally to the same result” and that the interpretation preferred
by the court may not be “the only authentic interpretation of legislative
intent.”142 As argued in Part II and for the reasons expressed by the House
of Lords in ex parte Adan, while core human rights guarantees conferred
by international conventions could conceivably be open to different but
equally authentic interpretations, it falls to the national courts of the State
Party to decide the preferable interpretation by which the State will meet
its treaty obligations. In the refugee protection context, where protection
claimants’ lives, liberty and security of the person depend on the meaning
ascribed to these treaties, leaving the choice of “authentic interpretation”
up to individual adjudicators, some of whom are not fully independent
from the government, would be antithetical to the rule of law and breach
Canada’s obligation to implement its treaty obligations in good faith.
Finally, even if reviewing courts conduct “disguised” correctness
reviews143 under the guise of a reasonableness review of decision-makers’
interpretation of ss. 96-98 of the IRPA, calling this correctness would have
the advantage of transparently and accurately describing how reviewing
courts are actually approaching their supervisory role, and would further
Dunsmuir’s ambition of developing a “principled framework” to the
judicial review of administrative action. In the event that the Supreme
Court persists in restricting opportunities for correctness review or opts
to eliminate correctness as a common law standard of review altogether
in favour of a deferential approach across the board, Part IV explores
legislative reforms that could ensure the correctness review of certain
questions of law.
IV. Legislating the standard of review in the refugee protection context
As noted in Part I, recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
indicate that the continued existence of correctness as a common law
standard of review may be in peril. We have argued that correctness should
be retained as a common law standard of review. If the Court decides
to abolish correctness, Parliament should mandate a correctness standard
142. Ibid at 111.
143. David Mullan, “The True Legacy of Dunsmuir—Disguised Correctness Review” (15 February
2018), Double Aspect (blog), online: <https://doubleaspect.blog/2018/02/15/the-true-legacy-ofdunsmuir-%E2%80%95-disguised-correctness-review>.
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within relevant statutes for the review of crucial questions of law. In the
refugee determination context in particular, Parliament should require the
correctness review of decisions involving the interpretation of provisions
of the IRPA that serve to implement basic human rights protections
guaranteed by international conventions.
The notion of legislatures specifying a particular standard of review
is not unheard of, though not entirely common.144 British Columbia’s
Administrative Tribunals Act, for example, speci¿es for certain tribunals
particular standards of review, including correctness, based on the nature
of the question and on the presence of a privative clause in the statute
under which the application arises.145 The correctness standard was indeed
applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia Human
Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk,146 a case involving a question of law and
statutory interpretation arising out of the province’s Human Rights Code.
Based on the arguments presented earlier in this article, it may behoove
Parliament to establish, explicitly, a correctness standard of review in
connection with questions of law arising from Part 2 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act concerning refugee protection, or at the very
least speci¿c provisions, including the scope of the protections arising
from the Refugee Convention and implemented into the IRPA, through
sections 96 and 98.147 A correctness standard could also be applied to other
portions of Part 2 of the IRPA such as section 97 which concerns persons in
need of protection who face torture within the meaning of the Convention
Against Torture as well as those facing cruel and unusual punishment.
In addition, the provisions in part 2 of the IRPA are not the only ones
that apply to persons seeking refugee status. For example, the provisions
that determine when foreign nationals are inadmissible to Canada have
been applied to refugee claimants as well as those seeking to immigrate to
Canada.148 The interpretation of such provisions by the ID and IAD may
have a tremendous impact on would-be applicants in a manner no less
144. Capilano, supra note 31 (stating: “Subject to constitutional constraints, the legislature can
specify the applicable standard of review. In British Columbia, for example, the legislature has
displaced almost the entire common law on the standard of review (see the Administrative Tribunals
Act, SBC 2004, c 45, ss 58 and 59). Unfortunately, clear legislative guidance on the standard of review
is not common” at para 35).
145. Administrative Tribunals Act, supra note 144, ss 58-59.
146. British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62 at para 28, [2017] 2 SCR 795.
147. Ward, supra note 83 at 739, 746-747; Pushpanathan, supra note 84 at paras 65-74; Ezokola,
supra note 53; Febles, supra note 54. There may be other provisions of the IRPA whose interpretation
may demand correctness review. These include s. 112(3), which provides for the conferral of refugee
protection in the context of a pre-removal risk assessment and s. 115, which sets out the principle of
non-refoulement.
148. See Oremade v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1077.
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consequential than would their exclusion under Article 1F of the Refugee
Convention, incorporated by s. 98 of the IRPA. Accordingly, correctness
may be a suitable standard of review for questions of law respecting nonRefugee Convention-derived provisions within the IRPA that directly
impact on the refugee status determinations of asylum applicants and their
eligibility.
The explicit establishment of a correctness standard of review for
questions of law that arise in connection with these provisions of the IRPA
is in the government’s interest. While refugee protection claimants, foreign
nationals and permanent residents most frequently apply for judicial review
of IRB decisions, there are occasions where the government is the party
seeking judicial review. Where the federal government is of the view that
an administrative decision-maker has erred in interpreting a key provision
of the IRPA, it has an interest in securing a de¿nitive interpretation from
the courts which may work to its advantage as it has in past cases.149 This
interest has been recognized in the IRPA through a mechanism by which
the parties, including the government, can formulate questions, including
questions of statutory interpretation, and seek their certi¿cation as serious
questions of general importance meriting consideration by the Federal
Court of Appeal and, if leave is granted, by the Supreme Court.150
Conclusion
The proper approach to be taken in judicial review of administrative
decisions has been a recurring if not troubling question in Canadian
administrative law.151 The Supreme Court of Canada is now revisiting the
matter and may even be contemplating the further curtailment or even
the complete abolition of correctness as a standard of review available
at common law. In this article, we have taken the position that particular
questions of law must be reviewed on a correctness standard. Speci¿cally,
in the context of refugee protection decision-making, we have argued for a
non-deferential approach to the review of administrative decision-makers’
interpretation of sections 96-98 of the IRPA which, in de¿ning the scope of
refugee protection, implement fundamental international legal norms and
human rights protections. Such questions, in our view, qualify as questions
of law that are both of central importance to the legal system as a whole
149. See Mossop, supra note 103; B472, supra note 62.
150. IRPA, supra note 3, s 74(d). Though the certi¿cation of a serious question of general importance
triggers an appeal, review by the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court is not limited to the
certi¿ed question but extends to all available grounds of review, including the unreasonable exercise
of discretion: Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR
(4th) 193; Agraira, supra note 57.
151. Dunsmuir, supra note 5 at para 1.
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DQGRXWVLGHWKHUHODWLYHH[SHUWLVHRIWKHWULEXQDOVDQGRI¿FLDOVHPSRZHUHG
WRPDNHGHFLVLRQVXQGHUWKHIRPA7KHIXQGDPHQWDOLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHVH
TXHVWLRQVDQGWKHVHULRXVLPSDFWRIUHIXJHHSURWHFWLRQGHFLVLRQVRQUHIXJHH
FODLPDQWV¶ OLIH OLEHUW\ RU VHFXULW\ RI WKH SHUVRQ UHTXLUH XQLIRUP DQG
FRQVLVWHQWDQVZHUVWKDWRQO\QDWLRQDOFRXUWVFDQSURYLGH,QDGGLWLRQZH
SRVLWWKDWDFRQWH[WXDOVWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZDQDO\VLVDOVRPLOLWDWHVLQIDYRXU
RI FRUUHFWQHVV UHYLHZ 7KH QRQGHIHUHQWLDO DSSURDFK WKDW ZH DGYRFDWH
IDU IURP EUHDNLQJ QHZ JURXQG LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V
KDQGOLQJRIVXFKTXHVWLRQVEHIRUHDQGDIWHUDunsmuir7RWKHH[WHQWWKDW
WKH&RXUW¶VFXUUHQWDSSURDFKSUHFOXGHVFRUUHFWQHVVUHYLHZLQWKLVFRQWH[W
E\QDUURZO\GH¿QLQJWKHFRUUHFWQHVVFDWHJRU\RIJHQHUDOTXHVWLRQVRIODZ
DQGOLPLWLQJWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHFRQWH[WXDODQDO\VLVLWPXVWEHFKDQJHG
7KH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH FRUUHFWQHVV VWDQGDUG WR WKH UHYLHZ RI
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHGHFLVLRQPDNHUV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRISURYLVLRQVRIWKHIRPA
WKDWLPSOHPHQWEDVLFKXPDQULJKWVFRQIHUUHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQYHQWLRQV
ZLOO QRW QHFHVVDULO\ DGYDQWDJH DV\OXP VHHNHUV ,Q VRPH FDVHV WKH
UHYLHZLQJFRXUWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVFRXOGYHU\ZHOOOHDGWRDORZHUOHYHORI
SURWHFWLRQIRUUHIXJHHFODLPDQWVDVHYLGHQFHGLQVHYHUDOFDVHVZKHUHWKH
FRXUWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVIDYRXUHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQ1HYHUWKHOHVV
LWLVYLWDOWKDWDEVHQWDELQGLQJLQWHUSUHWDWLRQE\WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RXUW
RI -XVWLFH &DQDGLDQ FRXUWV DQG XOWLPDWHO\ &DQDGD¶V 6XSUHPH &RXUW
GHWHUPLQHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHUXOHVRIWUHDW\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKHRQHWUXH
PHDQLQJRIWKHRefugee Convention¶VEDVLFKXPDQULJKWVSURWHFWLRQVDQG
RIWKHSURYLVLRQVLQWKHIRPAWKDWLPSOHPHQWWKHP5HDVRQDEOHQHVVUHYLHZ
ZKLFKE\GH¿QLWLRQUHFRJQL]HVWKDWVRPHTXHVWLRQVGRQRWOHQGWKHPVHOYHV
WRRQHVSHFL¿FSDUWLFXODUUHVXOWGRHVQRWJXDUDQWHHWKDWFRXUWVZLOOIXO¿OO
WKLVLPSRUWDQWUROH'LVJXLVHGFRUUHFWQHVVUHYLHZXQGHUDUHDVRQDEOHQHVV
VWDQGDUG REIXVFDWHV WKH WUDQVSDUHQF\ DQG WUXH QDWXUH RI WKH XQGHUWDNLQJ
DQG UHTXLUHV DOO DFWRUV WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ D OHJDO ¿FWLRQ ,W LV WLPH IRU WKH
6XSUHPH &RXUW WR UHFRJQL]H RQFH PRUH WKDW WKH DSSURSULDWH VWDQGDUG RI
UHYLHZLQWKLVFRQWH[WLVFRUUHFWQHVV

 6HHHJFebles FCAsupraQRWHB472supraQRWH

